Procedural consolidation aims to provide a solution for multinational corporate groups to achieve the goals of preservation group value and certainty. This article explores the desirability of procedural consolidation in the light of multinational enterprises theories, in particular, through the lens of business network perspective. It argues that there is an inherent difficulty to balance the goal of preservation of group value and the goal of certainty by procedural consolidation. This is due to the fact that multinational corporate groups achieve an important part of group value by means of spreading head office functions across the group; pulling subsidiaries into one insolvency jurisdiction will either destroy such value or disrespect the current insolvency jurisdiction rule.
Introduction
When some subsidiaries in one multinational corporate group (Hereafter MCGs) face financial difficulties, the other subsidiaries in other member states will also suffer.
1 Procedural consolidation is a way to facilitate the insolvency of MCGs by allowing the insolvency proceedings of foreign companies in the same groups to open in one national court. The rationale underpinning procedural consolidation is to preserve the value of corporate groups as one economic integration and reduce the cost of "This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Z. Daoning (2017)Reconsidering procedural consolidation for multinational corporate groups in the context of the recast European insolvency regulation,International Insolvency Review, 26.3, pp 241-357, which has been published in final form at 10.1002/iir.1286. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving."
Reconsidering procedural consolidation for multinational corporate groups in the context of the recast European insolvency regulation multiple insolvency proceedings that would otherwise incur. Also, both corporate rescue law theory and cross-border insolvency law theories embrace the value of certainty.
Procedural consolidation therefore needs to provide a good balance of these values.
To make procedural consolidation happen, there are two possible ways. One radical way is by free choice of insolvency law, which is almost impossible due to its serious drawbacks. Another conduit is by means of insolvency jurisdiction rules; it entails one court having insolvency jurisdiction for all group members. The latter touches on the insolvency jurisdictional rule-Center of main interest (CoMI) in the EU regulation on insolvency proceeding recast 2015(EIR recast). 2 A prerequisite basis for procedural consolidation is to find group CoMI or move CoMI of subsidiaries to one place.
The aim of this article is to examine whether procedural consolidation is a reliable solution for large MCGs in the EU. It explores this issue in the light of multinational enterprise theories especially via a business network perspective. It argues that there is an inherent difficulty for procedural consolidation to achieve preservation of group value and certainty at the same time, as one main part of MCGs' value is obtained by allocating head office functions to subsidiaries. The conclusion is that procedural consolidation may only be applied in very limited cases and it is not a reliable solution for MCGs.
The theoretical underpinning of procedural consolidation
Procedural consolidation means that subsidiaries belonging to the same insolvent MCGs can open their insolvency proceedings in ideally just one court. 3 Arguably, the benefit of it is to preserve the group value and to avoid additional cost arising from multiple insolvency proceedings which are otherwise opened. As a solution for the cross-border insolvency of MCGs aiming to preserve group value, one can argue that procedural consolidation can trace its purposes from both cross-border insolvency law and corporate rescue law: maximization of value and certainty.
The corporate rescue law is built around a concept named going concern value. 4 It is generally believed that going concern value may exist only when a company is kept intact and running. 5 In other words, an operating company may worth more intact than if it is broken up. 6 Therefore, releasing going concern value is in the interests of all the creditors and stakeholders. 7 Also, it is believed that insolvency law should respect non-insolvency law as a baseline, as alteration of non-insolvency law inside insolvency proceedings will provide stakeholders with incentives to conduct strategic behaviour thereby giving rise to the cost of insolvency 8 and the high cost of borrowing interest rate. 9 This is the certainty requirement pursued by corporate rescue law. 4 Going-concern value is the value of a company as an ongoing entity. This value differs from the whole value of a liquidated company's assets, because an ongoing operation has the ability to continue to earn profit, while a liquidated company does not. 
Procedural consolidation by free choice of insolvency law
Theoretically, procedural consolidation can be achieved by allowing parties to free-choice insolvency jurisdiction or CoMI. This section only concerns the former situation.
Free choice insolvency law provides that members of companies make the choice at the time of incorporation, and the choice could be changed later with creditors' consent. 21 In the case of MCGs, it is possible that many subsidiaries choose the same jurisdiction as the insolvency jurisdiction so as to achieve procedural consolidation. The collective nature means that it is desirable to apply one country's insolvency law as an integration rather than sourcing insolvency provisions from different countries. Another point worth mentioning is that corporate rescue law is in reality complex and elastic. 25 Whereas German insolvency law may focus more on debt collection, French insolvency law focuses more on social goals such as employment protection. 26 The same creditors in different member states may be treated differently. The best example is the different priority rankings of creditors in different member states' insolvency law. One creditor may be in the top ranking under local insolvency law, while he may be demoted to the second or even lower ranking under another country's insolvency law.
Imagining one creditor under the insolvency law of country A may enjoy certain priority that he would not enjoy under the insolvency law of country B. If creditors of one company but from different countries all argue that they should be treated according to their own countries' priority, no priority of ranking can be agreed and formed. As a result, the collectivity nature of insolvency law generally requires only one set of rules being applied to insolvency cases. The implication of this is that insolvency jurisdictional rules are to a large extent tied together with the choice of law rules. Where one court is entitled to seize jurisdiction, it could apply its own insolvency law to the given case.
EIR recast reflects this idea by incorporating a set of harmonized insolvency choice of The law of the court will decide the conditions of the opening of those proceedings, their conduct and their closure; also it decides many important aspects of bankruptcy law such as creditors' priority. 28 To protect the local interests, the regulation also provides certain exceptions to lexi fori concursus. 29 As a result, when procedural consolidation is considered by pulling other insolvent subsidiaries in front of the court of another jurisdiction, the consequence may be that certain creditors' rights are modified unfairly and unpredictably.
Also one cannot ignore the interaction of insolvency law and other laws in one country.
Insolvency law closely connects to employment law, corporate governance and secured credit law. 30 Allowing parties to opt for another country's insolvency before insolvency proceeding will break such interaction; also, parties may not be familiar with the chosen foreign law.
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A reason based on impracticability to refuse procedural consolidation is that procedural consolidation also requires all the countries to accept free choice of insolvency law introduce heavy transaction costs as it does not offer an efficient disclosure system to inform creditors to which insolvency law they will subject. 40 All these transaction costs will increase in the context of cross-border insolvency of MCGs, as more creditors are expected to join in the process of contracts negotiation. Therefore, procedural consolidation may more practicably be achieved by means of CoMI.
The puzzle of group CoMI
Since the last section reveals of the drawbacks of procedural consolidation achieved by free choice of insolvency law, this section deals with the question whether procedural consolidation can rely on the basis of CoMI.
It is obvious that EIR recast does not provide the concept of group CoMI. The benefit of centralizing insolvency proceedings of group members into one jurisdiction (in most cases, the parent's jurisdiction) have long been recognized.
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This requires one to find a joint group CoMI so that one court could deal with the cross-border insolvency for an entire group. The main reason to employ this concept is to centrally control the insolvency proceedings and to maximize the recovery of corporate group insolvency for creditors due to the higher likelihood of successful insolvency reorganization. 
A business network perspective of procedural consolidation
Procedural consolidation needs to preserve the value of MCGs while respecting the CoMI test. However, if there is an inherent contradiction between these two values in that group achieve its group going concern value by allocated head office functions across group members, the efficacy of procedural consolidation is limited. This section will explore this issue in more details.
Group going concern value of MCGs
European large corporate groups typically operate through the network of subsidiaries. That is to say, the knowledge and capacities to obtain resources are key for MCGs to gain advantages over rivals.
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It is important to note that many important innovations are achieved at the subsidiaries' From the above, one may argue that the relationships among members of MCGs may form group going concern value that should be preserved in cross-border insolvency.
The next question is whether the value could be preserved by procedural consolidation on the basis of CoMI. This begs the question how the head office functions are allocated within MCGs as CoMI is the place where the head office functions of one company are carried out.
The allocation of head office functions inside MCGs
Business network perspective provides useful insights of the allocation of control in
MCGs. 64 It focuses on the perspective of individual subsidiaries. The main tenet is that every subsidiary can be viewed as living in many idiosyncratic business networks consisting of internal and external fragmented environments. 65 Since the networks that the power of the overall networks of that subsidiary. 67 From resource dependence theory, the parent has to rely on their resources as it cannot understand how to properly use these resources without the facilitation of subsidiaries. As a result, the subsidiaries could use these resources to obtain power and autonomy in certain areas of decision-making irrespective of the desire of parent. In other words, certain subsidiaries' strategies derived from their networks will counterbalance the control from the parent company. hierarchies.
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Research has shown that relatively decentralised subsidiaries are more likely to learn and create value. 73 The relatively decentralised decision-making mandate allows subsidiaries to adapt to the local environment and respond to the exigencies quickly. By contrast, a hierarchical and centralised corporate group may not be able to cope with more and more complex environments and win in a fierce competition. 74 All this encourages international companies not to adopt a pure centralised and integrated business form of group, as it prevents the subsidiaries from learning from their environments and from contributing the group. As a result, parent companies need to allow certain subsidiaries to retain decision-making power in the areas where they have valuable expertise. Therefore, there may be more than one head office in a given MCG with different head office functions spread across different levels.
One thing worth mentioning is that CoMI location analysis entails a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors. Therefore, even though in some cases, parent companies can control the financial arrangements of all the subsidiaries, one cannot conclude that parent companies have ultimate control of subsidiaries. Put briefly, certain subsidiaries may control the research and development function which is at least equally important as the financial function. In fact, one research shows that technology-related head office functions can arguably yield the strongest control. only finance-related factors run against the principles of case law which requires a comprehensive analysis of all objective factors that are ascertainable to creditors. 76 It is more likely that the idiosyncratic and heterogeneous business networks of each subsidiary in one group confer every subsidiary different head office functions so that no clear group CoMI of that group can be found.
With the above finding in mind, the next section will consider how this will affect procedural consolidation.
Problems of procedural consolidation
At this stage, it is possible to examine whether procedural consolidation offers a good solution to the insolvency of MCGs on the basis of CoMI test. Here it is important to note one distinction between whether EIR recast allows procedural consolidation and whether procedural consolidation can achieve the goals it aims to achieve. Even if EIR recast allows procedural consolidation, it does not justify it in all circumstances.
Admitted that in the cases where the subsidiaries' CoMIs are indeed in their parent's location and are ascertainable to third parties, relevant insolvency proceedings of subsidiaries still could be opened in the place of the parent company. 77 One can also argue that EIR recast still allows procedural consolidation. 80 However, this says nothing about whether procedural consolidation can offer a good balance between preservation of group going concern value and certainty.
One should not assume that all the courts may seize insolvency jurisdiction in good faith by conducting a CoMI analysis for all subsidiaries. 81 It has been argued that the insolvency courts be biased to decide CoMI or even compete for the insolvency jurisdiction; the courts are more likely to act in favour of managers and other allies rather than the unsecured creditors. 82 As big cases are usually lucrative, the courts and insolvency practitioners cannot be expected to give them up to other jurisdictions.
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We can also witness that some scholars call for attaching great importance to registered place test by making it difficult to be rebutted. 84 This is the emphasis of the goal of for all companies involved, 86 there is no uniform standard of the analysis. Which factors should be given more weight when considering CoMI? And how many factors in one location can determine CoMI?
Only in the MCGs whose business are neatly centrally controlled and integrated, 87 it is possible to achieve similar results like Daisytek case. However, business network perspective of MCGs shows an inherent contradiction between group going concern value and the allocation of head office functions. That is, the group going concern value is achieved by means of spreading head office functions across subsidiaries. Based on current understanding of CoMI, procedural consolidation may not preserve group going concern value by pulling other subsidiaries into one jurisdiction on the one hand and provide certainty to local creditors who may well percept that the local subsidiaries are undertaking certain head office functions on the other hand. Procedural consolidation changes the applicable law to those creditors, so even though a centralized group rescue plan can bring a larger pie to creditors, the uncertainty caused by such practice may give rise to an increase of interest rate to the society.
It is true that creditors or debtors may move CoMI to one country for the purpose of procedural consolidation. Using forum shopping as a method to achieve procedural consolidation is dangerous for several reasons. The foremost one is that when forum shopping happens at operating companies' level, it may destroy group going concern value. From a business network perspective, the relationships between subsidiaries and their external environment are the main component of the group going concern value of MCGs. Part of the group going concern value is gained through the foreign subsidiaries as they can absorb foreign countries' specific advantages. The movement of real CoMI 86 may change the environment where foreign subsidiaries are embedded and cut off their conduits to gain foreign resources and capacities. As a result, a transfer of real CoMI means that foreign subsidiaries cannot transform the advantages of foreign countries into the group going concern value, as their business locations have been changed.
These transferred subsidiaries cannot transform the country-specific resources into company-specific resources and transfer these value to the MNCs. The decrease of the value as a result of a forum shopping may outweigh the cost saved by procedural consolidation.
When procedural consolidation via forum shopping happens at holding level, the problems of above may dwindle. 88 Holding companies may only have institutional secured creditors to take care and more importantly, they do not have a complicated location-bound external environment. In fact, it has been seen some MCGs insolvency cases happened at holding levels, especially involving the pre-pack sale of operating companies.
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However, certain foreign insolvency law procedures such as pre-pack administrations may benefit senior creditors at the expense of junior ones. 90 The Wind Hellas case is an example of forum shopping for the purpose of making use of UK pre-pack administration and schemes of arrangement. This is also the case involve procedural consolidation as six companies in the group transferred CoMIs to the UK. 91 The result attracted heavy criticism as it left the unsecured creditors with 1.5 billion Euros unpaid. 92 The motive of the senior creditors moving companies to the UK may be suspicious as it can be said to going around the contractual protection to junior creditors provided by inter-creditor agreement. 93 This change dramatically modified junior creditors' expectations and the drawbacks of the flexible restructuring law, such as pre-pack, could be released if it was not used properly. The whole process was also suspiciously rigged by debtors, since some information was only available to the successful bidder but not to others. 94 Therefore, procedural consolidation by forum shopping should be subject to close scrutiny. Also, as above-mentioned, if it happens at the level of operating companies, the result may be far more harmful.
It seems a better direction of development is to design debt restructuring rules to facilitate MCGs reaching rearrangements with senior creditors at the holding companies' level while keeping the operating subsidiaries intact. The aim is to avoid group-wide insolvency or at least allow the operating group to be transferred to new buyers without the need of forum shopping. Nonetheless, this solution needs to make sure that insolvency jurisdiction is respected and adequate protection is granted to junior financial creditors. 91 Hellas III, Hellas IV, Hellas V, Hellas VI are all holding companies in the group which bear debt and obligation of guarantees stipulated in the same inter-creditor agreement. 
Conclusion
As the above analysis indicates, procedural consolidation may contain inherent drawbacks in solving cross-border insolvency issues for MCGs. Though cost may be reduced by centralizing the insolvency proceedings of subsidiaries to their ultimate parent's one, the cost from the uncertainty may outweigh the benefits of centralization.
Among other things, the main difficulty arises from the fact that MCGs achieve an important part of their group going concern value by spreading head office functions across member companies, which cripples the basis of procedural consolidation in that it may not achieve preservation of value and certainty at the same time.
